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The Approach to Follow 
The deficition of "disabiJity" has 
once again become a central issue in 
workers' compensation law. I am partly 
responsible. A decade ago I served as 
the Governor's Special Counselor on 
Workers' Compensation. In my Re-
portto the Cabinet Council on Jobs and 
Economic Development, I stated: "Ifl 
could write on a clean slate, I would 
prefer to see the M.ichigan definition 
brought even closer into the main-
stream of American law by decJaring 
that 'disability' means a 'limitation of 
an employee's wage earning capacity 
.~-- in work suitable to his or her qualifica-F tions and training resulting from a per-
sonal injury or work related disease."' 
T. St. Antoine, Workers' Compensa-
tion in Michiga11: Costs, Benefits, and 
Fairness, 27 (1984). 
Since the Michigan Legislature 
had gone through an arduous struggJe 
as recently as 1981 to define "disabil-
ity" for the first time with regard to 
personal injury, I recommended against 
any further tinkering right then with 
the new statutory definition. I also 
thought the change would "probably 
be of small practical consequence." 
Ibid. Despite that admonition, the Leg-
islature proceeded in 1987 to ad opt my 
"clean slate" phraseology verbatim and 
incorporate it into Section 418.301(4) 
of the act. 
My proposed language was based 
on the definition in the classic treatise 
of the late Arthur Larson, acknowl-
edged as the country's foremost au-
thorityon workers' compensation Jaw. 
As I said in my Report, the effect of the ~ change would be to substitute Larson's 
formulation, "work suitable to 
claimant's qualifications and training," 
by Theodore J. St. Antoine 
/ 
_,.,-' 
for tbe 1981language referring to the 
"employee's general field of employ-
ment." The difference was to shift at-
tention from the kind of work an em-
ployee was in fact doing to the kind of 
work the employee was qualified to do. 
But there was no change, proposed or 
enacted, in the preexisting language of 
Section 418.301(4) that "disability" 
meant "a limitation of an employee's 
wage earning capacity ... "(emphasis 
supplied). 
In drafting a statute, one should 
not be so presumptuous as to think that 
all conceivable cases and issues to 
arise in the future can be anticipated 
and resolved in advance. But at least 
one can lay down some general guide-
lines and provide some sense of the 
approach to be followed in interpreting 
and applying a new statutory provi-
sion. The clearly stated purpose of my 
proposed language, which the Legisla· 
ture adopted exactly as I suggested, 
was to bring the Michigan definition of 
"disability" closer into the "mainstream 
of American law" by substituting Pro-
fessor Larson's phraseology for that of 
the 1981legislation. Larson'sownsum-
mation of the main body of compensa-
tion doctrine is therefore the surest 
guide to the proper interpretation of the 
1987 amendment. 
Moreover, as I emphasized in my 
1984 Report, even the Legislature's 
original 1981 definition of "disabil-
ity," with its reference to "a limitation 
of an employee's wage earning capac-
ity in the employee's general field of 
employment" (emphasis supplied), was 
designed to rid the Michigan system of 
a judge-imposed notion that "disabil-
ity" meant an "inability to do the work 
the claimant was doing at the time of 
injury." St. Antoine, supra, at 23-24, 
27. That led to "freakish" results, to use 
Arthur Larson's term. An example was 
the case of the skilled coal miner who 
was so badly burned in a mine explo-
sion that he could not stand exposure to 
summer heat or winter cold, but who 
was held to have no permanent disabil-
ity at all because he could resume his 
work in tbe relatively constant tem-
peratures underground (until the mine 
closed for economic reasons). Kaarto v 
Calumet& Hecla, Inc., 367 Mich 128 
(1962). 
In addition, I emphasized that the 
only way to achieve a dramatic reduc-
tion in eligibility for wage loss benefits 
by a change in the definition of "dis-
ability" would be through the sort of 
extremely strict definition employed 
in Social Security disability determi· 
nations. St. Antoine, supra, at 27-28, 
citing 42 USC § 423 (d}(2)(A). The 
Legislature obviously did not pursue 
that course in amending Section 
418.301(4). In contrast, it did impose a 
far stricter standard of disability in 
Section 418.373 to disqualify persons 
receiving nondisability pensions or 
retirement benefits ("unable ... to 
perfonnworksuitabletotheemployee's 
qualifications ... ") (emphasis sup-
plied). 
The current dispute over "disabil-
ity" under Section 418.301(4) pits two 
opposingviewsagainst each other. One 
position is that it requires "only a limi-
tation, not total limitation, of wage-
. earning capacity in work suitable to 
qualifications and training" (emphasis 
in the original). Harris v United Tech-
Continued on page 60 
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nologies, 1989 ACO #222, 1989 ACO 
1087, 112 MIWCLR 1190 (1989). The 
other view is that the "relevant in· 
quiry" is "whether the plaintiff bas the 
ability to work at any other type of job 
by virtue of his or her qualifications 
and training" (emphasis supplied), 
Hooker v US Mfg., 1992 ACO #346, 
1992 Mich ACO 1053, 115 :MIWCLR 
1275 (1992), and "if an employee is 
found able to do any of those jobs, the 
employee cannot be found to be dis-
abled" (emphasis supplied), Paquin v 
AZCO-Hennes, 1992AC0#364, 1992 
Mich ACO 1112, 115 MIWCLR 1292 
(1992). 
Understandably, employers are 
concerned that under the first analysis, 
workers' compensation could become 
a high-benefit form of unemployment 
compensation, especially in peri~ds of 
recession. But this is what Arthur Larson 
has to say: " [An] injured claimant may 
honestly represent to the Employment 
Security office that he is able to do 
some work, and with equal honesty tell 
the Compensation Board later that he 
was totally disabled during the same 
period since, ahhougb be could have 
done some kinds of work, no one would 
give him a job because of his physical 
handicaps" (emphasissupplied).lCA. 
Larson, The Law of Workmen 's Com· 
pensation § 57.65, p.10-492.50 (199.3). 
Even more to the point, Larson 
repeatedly cites USF&G Ins. Co. v. 
Giles, 340 SE 2d 284 (Ga App 1986), 
as "bris kly" handling a problem that 
bas troubled such a major wage-loss 
state as Florida. See Larson, supra, § 
57.22(c), p. 10-189. In Giles, an em-
ployee resigned his job as claims ad-
juster for USF&G after suffering a car 
accident on the job and took a similar 
position with CNA. Later the employee 
was laid off by CNA because of a 
60 
reduction in force. Giles bad experi-
ence as a construction worker and ath-
letic coach, and could have obtained 
such employment but for his work-
related injury. The court sustained a 
finding of total disability. Larson quotes 
the court as follows: "It is not the 
ability to perform the particular job in 
which one is engaged at the time of 
injury which is the determining factor 
in a case such as this, but rather w he the r 
the claimant's inability to find any 
work for which he is suited by training 
and experience is a result of the injury 
s uffered" (emphasis in the original). 
Speaking generally, Larson ob-
serves: "It is unifomlly held . . . , with-
out regard to statutory variations in the 
phrasing of the test, that a finding of 
disability may stand even when there is 
evidence of some actual post-injury 
earnings equaling or exceeding those 
received before the accident." Larson, 
s~p~a. § 57.21_(c),p.l0-136. This analy-
SIS 1s wholly m keeping with the plain 
wording of Section 418.301(4), which 
speaks of disability as "a" limitation on 
wage·earning capacity, not as the total 
elimination of that capacity. 
Thus, it should follow that if an 
employee is qu al ified to do three jobs, 
and a work-related injury prevents her 
from doing one of them, she has a 
"disability," even though she remains 
quite capable of performing the other 
two. Hooker and Paquin, cited above, 
are of course to the contrary. (The 
recent Court of Appeals decision in 
Soboti«J vChrysler Corp. (No. 139559, 
3/11/93) is not necessarily in conflict 
since it deals with a pre-1982 injury: 
before there was any applicable statu-
tory definition of "disability.") 
Naturally, the set-off provisions 
ofSections418.301(5)(b), 418.361(1 ), 
and 418.371(1) provide for appropri-
ate deductions from the compensation 
othe':"'ise due an injured employee 
who IS able to obtain gainful employ-
men~ in spite of his injury. Similarly, 
Sechon 418 .301(5)(a) disqualifies an 
